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We report on the results of experiments where participants choose between entrepreneurship
and an outside option. Entrepreneurs enter a market and then make investment decisions to
capture value. Payoffs depend on both strategic risk (i.e., the investments of other entrepreneurs)
and natural risk (i.e., luck). Absent natural risk, participants endogenously sort themselves
into entrepreneurial and safe types, and returns from the two paths converge. Adding natural
risk fundamentally changes these conclusions: Here we observe excessive entry and excessive
investment so that entrepreneurs earn systematically less than the outside option. These payoff
differences persist even after many repetitions of the task. With a risky outside option, entry
further increases and about one-third of entrepreneurs adopt a passive strategy, investing little or
nothing. Finally, we examine an environment where an individual must become an entrepreneur
but chooses the stakes over which she will compete. Due to under-entry and under-investment in
the high stakes setting, the returns gap grows to over 15 percentage points. A two-factor model
incorporating loss aversion and love of winning can rationalize these returns patterns.
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1. Introduction
Many view entrepreneurship as a fundamental driver of economic growth. As a
result, countries routinely subsidize entrepreneurship, especially small-scale ventures.
An important determinant of entrepreneurial activity and performance are the risks
entrepreneurs face. Thus, much of the entrepreneurship literature seeks to identify
characteristics, such as risk preferences, as well as personality traits of would-be
entrepreneurs.1 Wu and Knott (2006) point out that, although entrepreneurs are
conventionally risk-averse in responding to demand uncertainty, they are risk-seeking
(overconfident) about risks related to their own ability. In this paper, we distinguish
between two aspects of risk: Strategic risk is the risk associated with the fact that payoffs
are affected by the actions of other entrepreneurs and success or failure depends not
only on one’s own entrepreneurial decisions, but also on the entrepreneurial decisions
of others. It is more difficult to succeed, and entrepreneurial returns are likely to be
lower, in crowded markets where competitors invest heavily. Natural risk recognizes
that entrepreneurial decisions alone do not determine financial outcomes. Luck also
plays a crucial role. Certainly, any aspiring entrepreneur opening up a new restaurant
or coffee shop realizes the role that fads, fashions, and other vicissitudes of fortune
have on outcomes. We study the impact of these different types of risk on entry into
entrepreneurship and subsequent performance.
Controlling for differences in strategic versus natural risk as well as the levels and
riskiness of a would-be entrepreneur’s outside option is difficult using field data. Thus,
we use laboratory experiments to examine how these factors influence entrepreneurship.
This has the advantage that we can control for these aspects of the market precisely. It
also lets us compare rates of return between entrepreneurship and an outside option
including how these returns vary over time. Finally, we also examine the life-cycle of
entrepreneurship decisions, that is, how experience affects both entry and investment
in entrepreneurial activity.
As far as we are aware, our study is one of the first to investigate different types
of entrepreneurial risks using the methodology of laboratory experiments. We do this
by examining choices to enter a competitive environment, where we manipulate the
risks associated with entering or not.2 Although we refer to entrants as “entrepreneurs”
throughout the paper, this is merely a metaphor for the situations that we sought to
approximate via experiments. We labeled choices neutrally when presenting them to
subjects, and we cannot know if a subject had in mind the role of entrepreneur. We
could equally well have labeled an entrant as a “contestant” because our entrepreneur-
ship game is mathematically equivalent to a Tullock contest. Previous experiments have
examined isolated aspects of the entrepreneur’s choice. For example there is an extant
experimental literature on the decision to enter the market in the first place. In the stan-
dard entry experiment, individuals simultaneously decide whether or not to enter and
payoffs are determined according to a schedule such that entry payoffs are decreas-
ing in the number of entrants. Equilibrium, which is in mixed strategies, suggests that
1. See, for example, Parker (2009) who offers a survey as well as Caliendo and Kritikos (2012) for an
overview of recent developments in this literature.
2. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) also study entry into a tournament-like setting, but do not manipulate
risks. Several experiments have used a similar competitive environment to us (Tullock contests, Tullock, 1980),
and manipulate the riskiness of the contest, but do not examine entry decisions (e.g., Chowdhury et al., 2014;
Masiliunas et al., 2012; Fallucchi et al., 2013; Shupp et al., 2013). We summarize these findings on p. 6. See also
Bohnet et al. (2008), as well as Eckel and Wilson (2004), for comparisons of strategic and natural risk in trust
settings.
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entry will occur up to the point where the expected profits of each entrant are equal
to the value of the outside option. The main finding in this literature is that theory
models of entry perform well in characterizing behavior. Indeed, Nobel Laureate Daniel
Kahneman famously quipped that theory worked like “magic” in predicting behavior
in these games.3 Subsequent studies have found slight tendencies toward excess entry
when equilibrium predicts few entrants and under-entry when equilibrium predicts
many entrants (see Camerer, 2003, for a review). Even so, the fundamental prediction
of competitive equilibrium—payoff equalization of entrants relative to the second best
alternative—continues to acquit itself nicely.
The central contribution of our paper is to study entry decisions in contexts that
more closely mimic those faced by entrepreneurs. Specifically, we modify the standard
entry game as follows: Subjects make real-time entry decisions where they observe the
number of entrants currently in the market. In our view, this is a closer match to the
reality of entry than the usual model where entry decisions are made simultaneously and
where the key difficulty is to overcome the coordination problem. Following the entry
decision, entrants participate in a Tullock (lottery) contest in which they simultaneously
make investments in their businesses. Larger relative investments produce a greater
expected share of the profits in the industry; however success is by no means guaranteed.
In some treatments, luck plays a key role—here a single winner is determined where
the probability of winning is proportional to the relative investments made. In contrast,
in our Shares treatment, the link between payoffs and investment is more direct. Each
entrant enjoys a fraction of industry profits in proportion to their investments.
We also vary the nature of the outside option. We conduct treatments where the
outside option is deterministic. But in practice the alternative to not entering a market
may be inherently risky. Indeed, often the second best use of an entrepreneur’s time and
talent is undertaking another, different startup. To capture these differences, we also re-
port the results of treatments where the payoff from the outside option is stochastic (Coin
Flip treatment) and where the outside option represents an alternative entrepreneurial
opportunity with different stakes (Dual treatment).
Together, our treatments shed light on the role of strategic versus natural risk
on entry decisions and post-entry performance. They also allow for a more nuanced
view of the fundamental prediction of competitive equilibrium—the equalization of the
value of inside and outside options—when outside options have both environmental
and strategic risk as well. Our experiments are designed to come closer in bridging the
gap between the simple and elegant theory of equilibrium entry with the messy reality
of real world entry decisions.
We begin by reproducing the results from standard entry experiments (Baseline
treatment). Consistent with earlier studies, we observe payoff equalization between
entrepreneurship and the fixed outside option in a setting where “entrepreneurship”
merely amounts to entering a market and where each entrepreneur earns a fixed payoff
which is declining in the number of entrants. Moreover, specialization naturally arises:
some individuals repeatedly choose the entrepreneurship path whereas others follow a
different path and select the outside option.
Our main findings are:
In the Baseline experiment, entrepreneurs’ return on investment converges to
the outside option from below. This conclusion is unaltered with the addition
of strategic risk. When entrepreneurship involvesnatural risk as well, its return
3. Kahneman (1988).
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persistently lags the outside option, even after 50 periods. The returns gap is
widest in the Dual treatment, where the high stakes market produces returns
exceeding low stakes by more than 15 percentage points.
Entrepreneurial entry increases with the addition of natural risk, and in-
creases still more when the outside option exhibits natural risk as well. Nat-
ural risk also increases investment although when this risk is added to the
outside option, about one third of entrepreneurs adopt a passive strategy,
investing little or nothing in their ventures.
Entry occurs rapidly absent natural risk, but slows when this risk is added,
exhibiting a bimodal structure where the first entry occurs either extremely
early or much later in the entry stage.
Despite natural risk, the high stakes setting exhibits less entry and investing
than the risk-neutral prediction. Simultaneously, the low stakes setting ex-
hibits excess entry and investment; thus accounting for the extreme difference
in returns. This pattern persists even with considerable subject experience.
No single factor such as mistakes or risk aversion, can explain the data pat-
terns; however, the combination of love of winning and loss aversion can
rationalize key features of the data including the persisting gap in returns.
Our most important finding is the failure of competitive equilibrium to equalize
returns. Our data resemble many real-world patterns where entrepreneurial returns sys-
tematically lag employment alternatives albeit with spectacular individual successes.4
Importantly, the experiments isolate a key driver—natural risk—leading to this behav-
ior. These patterns are not explained by risk-seeking, but can be explained by an intrinsic
love of winning together with usual levels of loss aversion.
Our findings also shed light on the experimental literature on contests.5 The main
finding in this literature is that there is excess investment in these contests when com-
petitors are exogenously chosen. We allow for endogenous selection as well as varying
the payoff structure on the contest. A key finding is that, by eliminating natural risk
from the contest, overinvestment moderates significantly and indeed, payoffs are close
to equilibrium predictions. This result is consistent with those from other recent contest
experiments using an exogenous number of contestants that look at the effect of remov-
ing natural risk from the contest (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Fallucchi et al., 2013; Shupp
et al., 2013). However, the result is at odds with Cason et al. (2010), who performed
a real effort experiment where the outside option consists of piece rate payments and
the inside option is either a shares or winner-take-all contest. They find that the shares
(proportional prize) contest leads to greater entry but no difference in individual per-
formance (the analog to investments in our setting) relative to a winner-take-all scheme.
They suggest that differential entry is the result of skill differences among individuals.
Perceived skill differences appear less pronounced in our setting, perhaps explaining
the reversal in entry propensity.
The results from our Dual treatment relate to Mazzeo (2004) and Nguyen-Chyung
(2011), who highlight how changes in natural risk affect decisions about the type of
4. See, for example, Bloomberg Business Week (2003).
5. See, for example, Millner and Pratt (1989, 1991), Shogren and Baik (1991), Davis and Reilly (1998),
Anderson and Stafford (2003), Potters et al. (1998), Fonseca (2009), Herrmann and Orzen (2008), or Morgan
et al. (2011). Dechenaux et al. (2013) provide a recent survey of this literature.
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entrepreneurship to pursue. In particular, we find that when the stakes from winning
the market increase (i.e., entrepreneurship becomes riskier), individuals scale back their
entry and investment choices compared to equilibrium.
The persisting gap in returns to entrepreneurship compared to the outside option,
and our explanation, are consistent with the seminal paper of Hamilton (2000). He also
observes negative returns to entrepreneurship and traces this to non-pecuniary benefits.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experiment
as well as the rationale for each of the treatments and provides theoretical benchmarks.
In Section 3, we present the results of the experiments in terms of entry and investment
decisions. We pay particular attention to the dynamics of these choices—as we will see,
experience plays a key role. In Section 4, we explore various possible explanations for
the patterns in the data, and reject all single factor explanations. We show that a two
factor model containing loss aversion and love of winning can explain the main patterns
in the data both qualitatively and quantitatively. Section 5 concludes.
2. Experimental Design, Procedures, and Predictions
We conducted multiple sessions of the experiment at the University of Nottingham using
subjects recruited from a campus-wide distribution list of undergraduates. No subject
appeared in more than one session.
At the beginning of each session, we seated subjects at computer terminals and
gave them a set of instructions, which were read aloud.6 A monitor privately dealt with
any questions, and we permitted no communication between subjects. Choices and
information were transmitted via the computer network. Before the decision-making
part of the experiment began, we randomly divided subjects into groups of six, and
these remained fixed for the entire session. Subjects knew this but did not know with
whom they were grouped. Subjects earned points during the decision-making part of
the session, consisting of 50 rounds. We randomly chose one of these rounds and paid
subjects in cash according to their point earnings from it using an exchange rate of £0.10
per point. Sessions were 50 to 75 minutes long, and subjects earned between zero and
£28.50, averaging £10.81 (approximately US$20 at the time of the experiment).
Subjects began each round with 100 points and chose between two options labeled
“A” and “B,” where “A” corresponds to the outside option and “B” corresponds to the
decision to become an entrepreneur. Subjects saw a timer, counting down 15 seconds,
during which they were to make this choice. Subjects knew that if they did not choose
within the allotted time, the computer chose for them at random.7 During this time a
subject saw how many members of her group chose each option and how many had
yet to choose. Once a subject had chosen, she could not reverse that decision. Choice
information was anonymous—a subject could only see how many members there were
in each category, but not their identity. We did this to minimize the ability of subjects to
build reputations.
We varied the consequences from choosing A or B across experimental treatments
to study the effects of different types of risk and different outside options. Each ses-
sion featured only a single treatment, so our identification is between subjects. In each
6. See Appendix A for the instructions used in the experiment.
7. Once the timer had counted down from 15, the computer displayed “0” for one second before it made
the random choice. Thus, the effective time limit for subjects was in fact 16 seconds. About 2.5% of decisions
were made by the computer. Our results are unaffected by the inclusion or exclusion of these data.
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case, the instructions explained the relevant consequences of each choice using neutral
language.
Our Baseline treatment replicates earlier laboratory experiments on entry. Earnings
depended only on the number of entrants, and there were no post-entry decisions. In
this treatment, the outside option yielded 10 points whereas each of n entrepreneurs
earned 50/n2 points (rounded to integers). Subjects learned the payoffs of all group
members after each round.
The Shares treatment examines whether introducing post-entry choices, but not
natural risk, alters entry behavior. The outside option is unchanged in this treatment,
but we paid entrepreneurs based on their investments, which were made simultane-
ously, after the entry phase and knowing the number of entrepreneurs in the market.
Specifically, entrepreneur i investing xi (taken from her initial endowment) earned
a share xi/
∑
x j of a 50 point prize (rounded to integers). At the end of each round,
all subjects in the group, entrepreneurs or not, were informed about all payoffs, the
investments of each entrepreneur, and also reminded of the fixed outside option.
The entrepreneurship subgame with n entrepreneurs has a unique symmetric
equilibrium characterized by an investment of 8
x∗ (n) =
50 (n− 1)
n2
.
Given this equilibrium investment behavior, the expected profit from entrepreneur-
ship when there are n entrants is pi∗(n) = 50/n2 —the same as in the Baseline treatment.
Consequently, there is no predicted difference in the entry phases of the Shares and
Baseline treatments. Two entrepreneurs should enter and then earn 13 points each.
The Winner-Take-All treatment adds natural risk to the entrepreneurship environ-
ment. This treatment reflects the idea that real-world success depends on a combination
of investment and luck. This treatment is identical to Shares save for the fact that a
single entrepreneur received the entire 50 points and the others nothing. The probability
of winning depended on the relative investments, that is, xi/
∑
x j . To determine the
winner a computerized animated lottery wheel was used. If exactly one entrepreneur
chose to enter, that person received the prize automatically without having to invest.
Under risk neutrality, this treatment is isomorphic to Shares. If agents are risk
averse, then they will require compensation for entrepreneurship risk with the resulting
prediction that entrepreneurial returns should exceed the outside option.
The Coin Flip treatment reflects the fact that, in reality, non-entrepreneurship em-
ployment also contains risks. Of interest are the effects of varying the risk of the outside
option, without changing its average return, on entry into entrepreneurship. In this treat-
ment, the outside option involved a lottery in which the subject, with a 50–50 chance,
either won 35 points in addition to the initial endowment or lost 15 points. The outcome
of this lottery was determined and visualized with a computerized coin toss. In all other
respects the Coin Flip and the Winner-Take-All treatments were identical. Also as in
the other treatments, all subjects observed both the payoffs of the entrepreneurs and
non-entrepreneurs (in this case: either +35 or –15).
We picked the two coin-flip outcomes so that the expected return was 10 points
and the variance of the coin-flip payoffs was identical to the variance of payoffs under
entrepreneurship in the risk-neutral equilibrium.
8. See Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) for proof of uniqueness.
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Rarely is it the case that there is only one opportunity available to a would-be
entrepreneur. Evaluating from a set of opportunities is critical to entrepreneurship. The
profitability of these opportunities will, of course, vary depending on how many others
pursue them as well. To capture this, we conducted a Dual Market treatment, where
the outside option was another entrepreneurship game. Here, option A is a winner-take-all
game with a prize worth 200 points whereas option B is a winner-take-all game with
a prize worth 50 points. Options A and B represent high and low stakes entrepreneur-
ship opportunities, respectively. Under a risk-neutral equilibrium, if n entrepreneurs
choose the 50-point contest their expected payoff is 50/n2 points each, whereas the
expected payoff for the remaining entrepreneurs in the 200-point contest is 200/(6− n)2
points. The expected payoffs are equalized, and equal to 12.5, when n = 2 . With two
entrepreneurs in the 50-point contest and four in the 200-point contest switching to the
other contest would leave any entrepreneur worse off. Under any other distribution of
entrepreneurs between the two contests, however, switching is always payoff-improving
for individuals in one of the two groups.
So far we discussed the predictions for risk-neutral entrepreneurs only. In Ap-
pendix B, we offer a theory of continuous time entry under general risk- or loss-averse
preferences. The theory predicts both the amount and timing of entry. Our main results
are:
(1) Regardless of preferences, exactly two individuals enter in the Baseline and Shares
treatments. Entry occurs at the earliest possible moment.
(2) In the Winner-Take-All treatment, exactly two individuals enter. If entrepreneurship
is contested (i.e., more than two people would like to enter following the first en-
trant), then entry occurs immediately. If not, then entry can occur at any point in
equilibrium.
(3) Under the Coin Flip and Dual treatments, there are at least two entrants in the
small-prize contest. If this market is contested, entry occurs immediately.
Altogether 270 subjects participated in the experiment, 54 in each of the five treat-
ments. We ran a total of 15 sessions, three in each treatment, 18 subjects per session. Each
session was comprised of three groups of six subjects, yielding a total of 9 statistically
independent observations per treatment.9 Table I summarizes experimental design.
3. Results
3.1. Overview
We describe aggregate results using the metrics of the number of entrants and normal-
ized investment. Normalized investment is simply the difference between a subject’s
investment and their expected value/share of the prize under symmetric investment
behavior. Because entrepreneurs had an endowment of 100 tokens, the negative of this
statistic is the return on investment (hereafter ROI, and expressed as a percentage) from
entrepreneurship. The outside option yields a 10% return in all treatments except Dual
where also under the outside option investments needed to be undertaken. Competitive
equilibrium implies that returns on investment under the two paths should be equal;
9. In one of our Dual Market sessions a technical problem resulted in our losing the last three rounds of
data from one group and the last two rounds of data from the other two groups.
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Table I.
Experimental Treatments
Inside Outside
Option Risk Option Risk
Treatment (“Option A”)
Outside Option
(“Option B”)
Entrepreneurship
# Entrepreneurs
Equilibrium
Groups
Experimental
Strategic Natural Strategic Natural
Baseline 10 points Fixed payments declining
in number of
entrepreneurs
2 9 No No No No
Shares 10 points 50-point
proportional-shares
contest
2 9 Yes No No No
Winner-Take-All 10 points 50-point winner-take-all
contest
2 9 Yes Yes No No
Coin Flip 50–50 chance of+35 or
–15 points
50-point winner-take-all
contest
2 9 Yes Yes No Yes
Dual Market 200-point
winner-take-all
contest
50-point winner-take-all
contest
2 9 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table II.
Entry and Investment Behavior—All Rounds
10
Normalized Investment
Entry Investment − (Prize/Entrants)
Treatment Predicted Actual Break-Even Actual
Baseline 2 2.5*** – –
Shares 2 2.4*** –10 –4.1***
WTA 2 2.6*** –10 –0.4***
Coin Flip 2 3.6*** –10 –2.4***
Dual (Small) 2 2.4*** –10 –3.1***
Dual (Large) 4 3.6*** –10 –17.3*
hence the theory prediction of –10 (i.e., a 10% ROI from entrepreneurship), independent
of the number of entrants.
Table II presents the results of these two metrics, averaged over all rounds of the
experiment and delineated by treatment. For comparison, we also report the equilibrium
predictions. The stars after each metric denote the results of Fisher-Pitman permutation
tests comparing the empirical outcome to the theory prediction. Stars denote significance
at the 1, 5, and 10% levels for three, two, and one star, respectively.
Table II shows considerable excess entry, which is most striking under the Coin Flip
treatment. The exception to this pattern occurs in the Dual treatment with a large prize.
Excess entry is not, per se, disastrous to the returns from entrepreneurship provided
that subjects scale back investments sufficiently. However, Table II shows that this is
not the case. Returns from entrepreneurship fall well below the 10% threshold. The
Winner-Take-All treatment leads the way providing a measly 0.4% return. On the other
hand, excess returns can be found in the Dual (Large) treatment where entrepreneurship
10. To obtain p-values we use a two-sided Fisher–Pitman permutation test for paired replicates at the level
of statistically independent groups for both entry as well as normalized investment. We test entry against
the Nash equilibrium prediction of two entrants in the small prize contest and four in the large prize contest
and normalized investment against break-even normalized investment of -10. Note that we will use the
same test procedure throughout this section when we statistically compare observed behavior and theoretical
benchmarks.
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FIGURE 1. PAYOFF DIFFERENTIALS—ALL TREATMENTS
yields a whopping 17.3% ROI. As the stars on the table show, these discrepancies from
the theory predictions are all statistically significant at conventional levels.
3.1.1. Convergence to Competitive Equilibrium
The fundamental prediction of competitive equilibrium is that returns from en-
trepreneurship should equal those under the outside option. Although Table II showed
this was not the case, this could reflect a transition to competitive equilibrium as sub-
jects learned how to play the game. That is, a weaker requirement is simply that payoffs
converge to the competitive equilibrium prediction. For each treatment, Figure 1 plots
the returns differential, the difference between the ROI under entrepreneurship and that
under the outside option. A negative number indicates superior returns from the outside
option whereas a positive number indicates superior returns from entrepreneurship. The
dotted line at zero represents the competitive equilibrium prediction. Each data point
represents the average payoff difference over a ten round period.
As the figure shows, payoffs from entrepreneurship lag those from the outside
option in early rounds regardless of the treatment. This stems from both excess entry
and investment. In the Baseline treatment, the returns differences start small and soon
converge to equilibrium. The Shares treatment also converges by round 40 despite a
15% returns differential at the start of the experiment. However, these are the only
treatments to converge. For all other treatments, we can reject the null hypothesis of no
payoff difference over the last ten rounds of the experiment at conventional levels, again
using a Fisher–Pitman permutation test.
Treatments also display differing trends. For instance, the Coin Flip and Winner-
Take-All treatments approximately track the Shares treatment through round 30 and
then stall out at a negative returns differential. Indeed, payoff differentials worsen in the
last ten rounds under Winner-Take-All. The Dual treatment shows no trend whatsoever.
Initially, the returns under the large prize (the equivalent of the outside option under the
other treatments) vastly exceed those under the small prize, offering about a 17% higher
return, and remain at approximately this level throughout the experiment. Thus, we
see no evidence of convergence to equilibrium when entrepreneurship contains natural
risk.
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Table III.
Entry and Investment Behavior—Last 10 Rounds
Normalized Investment
Investment-Prize/Entrants
Treatment Entry Predicted Actual Break-Even Actual
Baseline 2 2.3*** – –
Shares 2 2.1 –10 –9.5
WTA 2 2.5*** –10 –4.4*
Coin Flip 2 3.9*** –10 –4.6***
Dual (Small) 2 2.6*** –10 –5.8***
Dual (Large) 4 3.4*** –10 –20.8**
Table III provides additional detail for how choices change as subjects gain experi-
ence. It reports the same statistics as Table II but restricts attention to the last ten rounds
of the experiment.
As with Table II, we overwhelmingly reject the theory predictions for entry save for
the Shares treatment. Moreover, entry does not move in a consistent direction either—
relative to entry over all rounds, late round entry falls modestly in Shares and Winner-
Take-All but increases in Coin Flip and Dual (Small). Strikingly, Dual (Large), which
offers exceptionally good returns, sees a reduction in entry in late rounds compared to
all rounds.
Normalized investments, however, display more consistent patterns. In Shares,
they converge to something close to equilibrium. In all other treatments normalized
investments differ from equilibrium, but are now somewhat closer to the returns from
the outside option. Subjects seem to learn to moderate their investments in the face of
excess entry into entrepreneurship.
3.1.2. Timing of Entry
In addition to the number of entrants, our continuous time environment allows us to
examine the timing of entry decisions. In Figure 2, we plot kernel densities of the time
at which the first and second person entered into entrepreneurship. The first entrant’s
timing is shown as a dashed line whereas the timing of the second entrant is depicted
as a solid line.
The theory predicts that, under contestability condition, all entry occurs near the
start of each round. Early entry stems from the fact that the pecuniary expected payoffs
from entrepreneurship slightly exceed the outside option owing to integer constraints.
When this difference is precisely observed by players, as in the Baseline treatment, the
predicted entry forces occur. As the figure shows, the first entry occurs very close to the
start of the game as does subsequent entry. The median time of the first and last entry is
a mere 0.31 and 0.56 seconds, respectively, under Baseline.
Adding the investment phase breaks the clear link between entrepreneurship pay-
offs and entry, which attenuates the force of early entry incentives. If subjects do not
anticipate systematic payoff improvements from entrepreneurship over the outside
option, the rationale for early entry disappears. Because the rate of return from en-
trepreneurship lags the outside option, there is no empirical rationale for early entry.
11. Kernel Density estimates of the timing of the first (dashed) and second (solid) entry decision. Kernel
= Epanechnikov, Bandwidth = 1.
430 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
0
.1
.2
.3
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 5 10 15
Time
first entrant
second entrant
Baseline
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
0 5 10 15
Time
Shares
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
0 5 10 15
Time
WTA
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 5 10 15
Time
Coin Flip
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
0 5 10 15
Time
Dual (Small)
0
.1
.2
.3
0 5 10 15
Time
Dual (Large)
FIGURE 2. TIMING OF FIRST AND SECOND ENTRY (ROUNDS 41–50)11
This explains why one does not see early entry, but does not explain the U-shaped
pattern.
One possible explanation takes its inspiration from clock games (Brunnermeier
and Morgan, 2010)12 . Entry in these games accounts for both pre-emption and waiting
motives. Because only a limited number of individuals can enter, early entry is advan-
tageous; however the payoffs from successful entry are higher the later the entry, which
encourages waiting. The analogy is inexact. There are no exogenous limits on entry in
our game, nor does the timing directly affect payoffs. As a result, theory predictions turn
entirely on the number of individuals who perceive the equilibrium payoffs from entry
as exceeding the outside option. When sufficiently many individuals see the situation
this way, theory predicts early entry. When few individuals see the situation this way,
any pattern of entry, including late entry, is consistent with equilibrium.
Clock games also predict that, when entry is transparent, that is, observed by all
the players, herding will occur immediately following the first entry. The reason is that,
in clock games, all players see entry as superior to the outside option. This is not the
case in our setting, nor do we see herding. Following the first entry, the median second
entrant waits roughly 1.8 seconds in all treatments exhibiting natural risk. Although this
time appears short, it represents a conscious delay on the part of the second mover in
light of psychometric estimates that place human reaction time for tasks of this nature
at roughly 0.5 seconds.13 Similarly, the median last entrant delays for around 5 seconds
before entering.
The selection of late entry, we suspect, arises from risk considerations. As usual,
equilibrium in our model presumes that players perfectly anticipate the final number
of entrants and resulting payoffs. This is, of course, not true in reality. By moving late,
12. Formally, clock games are continuous time exit games with increasing payoffs over some interval,
whose termination point is unknown by all players. Once k< n individuals exit, payoffs collapse to pi0. Those
who have not exited receive this payoff. If fewer than k players have existed by some uncertain end time T,
payoffs collapse exogenously and again those remaining receive this payoff. Each player receives a private
signal about T at a random time ti. In equilibrium, individuals wait for some fixed time, τ , after receiving
the signal, and then exit. The waiting time balances the marginal gains from waiting with the risk of payoff
collapse.
13. See Welford (1980).
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Table IV.
Gini Coefficients
Treatment All Rounds Rounds 1–10 Rounds 41–50
Baseline 0.61 0.51 0.83
Shares 0.61 0.54 0.81
Winner-Take-All 0.52 0.51 0.66
Coin Flip 0.42 0.44 0.49
Dual Market 0.48 0.47 0.63
subjects perhaps gain more precise estimates of the total number of entrepreneurs or
have less to fear out of equilibrium events where there are “excess” entrants. This reduces
the strategic risk associated with late entry and perhaps leads to its selection.
To summarize, the U-shaped pattern we observe for the timing of initial entry
(especially in the Shares and Winner-Take-All treatments) likely reflects an informational
motive not present in any equilibrium theory. In addition, unlike clock games, there is
no exogenous limit on entry in the entrepreneurship game, even though massive entry is
ruinous for payoffs. This creates a cautionary motive explaining the even more diverse
timing of the second entrant.
3.2. Who Becomes an Entrepreneur?
We previously saw that entry and investment varied across treatments; that is, depending
on the combination of strategic and natural risk associated with the inside and outside
options, subjects were more or less likely to pursue entrepreneurship and to invest
aggressively. We now examine individual level factors driving entry and investment.
Of course, to study individual factors requires that, to some degree, individuals
sort themselves into entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial types. Much of the extant
entrepreneurship literature, concerned as it is with identifying an “entrepreneurship
gene,” presupposes such a sorting, but cannot run the counterfactual experiment of
exposing the same entrepreneur to the same set of stimuli and seeing whether he or she
still pursued the same path. Our experiment, however, makes such an analysis possible.
Table IV displays Gini coefficients of entrepreneurship—the fraction of entry decisions
accounted for by each of the subjects—for each of the treatments. As with a standard
Gini coefficient, a value equal to zero indicates equality—all subjects are equally likely
to pursue each path. A coefficient equal to one denotes the opposite extreme—subjects
always choose a single path to the exclusion of the other. The three columns of the table
show how this measure of specialization varies over the course of the experiment.
As the table shows, experience tends to lead subjects to more defined roles. In every
treatment, the Gini coefficient associated with the first 10 rounds of the experiment
is lower than for the last 10 rounds.14 This suggests that, at least initially, subjects
experiment with different roles before determining the most suitable. Even though
subjects exhibit less variability in roles over time, they continue to switch, even in the
final 10 rounds of the game.
14. Formally, a permutation test reveals that the difference in Gini coefficients between the first and last
10 rounds of the experiment are all significant at the 5% level save for Coin Flip, where there is no significant
difference.
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Focusing on rounds 41–50, one can roughly group specialization into three tiers.
Treatments where natural risk is absent (Baseline and Shares) have the highest level of
specialization. As we introduce natural risk, specialization falls. The Dual and Winner-
Take-All treatments represent an intermediate level of specialization whereas the Coin
Flip treatment displays the lowest level of sorting.15 With the introduction of natural
risk, roles might well change depending on whether a subject has been lucky or not. In
the individual level analysis below, we show that luck is, indeed, an important driver to
the entrepreneurship decision.
The degree of specialization shown in Table IV suggests that it is fruitful to examine
the key drivers of entrepreneurship. The extant literature offers guidance as to which
explanatory variables to include. Obviously, skill at the entrepreneurship task is a critical
factor. We examine skill in several different ways: by direct measurement, as well as by
having a background more suited to the task of playing the entrepreneurship game. Our
direct measure consists of calculating the expected payoffs from entrepreneurship over
the first 25 rounds of the experiment for each individual.16 This allows us to capture
decision quality relatively untainted by the luck element of some of the treatments.
Our indirect skill measures reflect the quantitative nature of the investment task.
We include a dummy variable “numerate” which equals one if the subject indicated a
major in a field where mathematics or statistics are widely used. Likewise, business or
economics training would seem to be helpful in investing, so we include a dummy for
these majors labeled “business/econ.” Appendix C contains the list of major fields we
included in these two measures.
As hinted above, luck might also play an important role. We measure luck as the
difference between expected payoff and actual payoff from entrepreneurship in a given
round. In Coin Flip, we also construct an analogous luck variable for a success in the
outside option.
Our dependent variable is the decision to become an entrepreneur taken in each
round. We perform a probit analysis where we explain entry by skill, luck lagged by
one round, and demographic variables. Because we constructed the skill variable using
rounds 1–25, our analysis covers rounds 26–50 only. We compute separate estimates for
each treatment; thus, allowing for the possibility that explanatory variables like female
might differ depending on the risk structure of the environment. Finally, to control for
possible autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, our hypothesis tests use robust standard
errors clustered at the subject level. Table V reports the results of this analysis where we
report coefficient estimates as marginal effects.17
Using our direct measure, greater skill at the task strongly predicts entrepreneur-
ship. We can interpret the regression coefficients on skill as the percentage increase in
the probability of becoming an entrepreneur given a one unit increase in skill. To put
this increase in skill in perspective, the interquartile range of the skill measure is about
15. Formal statistical tests support this division. Treating each group as the unit of observation and per-
forming a permutation test on rounds 41–50 reveals that Baseline and Shares are statistically indistinguishable
although both are different from Winner-Take-All and Dual at the 10% level. Similarly, Dual and Winner-
Take-All are statistically indistinguishable, but Coin Flip differs from Winner-Take-All at the 10% significance
level.
16. Using a similar performance-based skill measure, Nguyen-Chyung (2011) shows that real estate agents
who sold more houses are more likely to pursue entrepreneurship than those who were less successful.
17. Owing to concerns about correlation between numerate and business/econ, we also performed the
analysis twice separately including only one of these variables. The results are little changed compared to
Table V.
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Table V.
Skill, Luck, and Selection into Entrepreneurship
Treatment Skill Numerate Business/Econ Luck Inside Luck Outside Female
Baseline 0.131*** 0.08 0.16 – – 0.02
Shares 0.018* 0.12 0.05 – – 0.09
Winner-Take-All 0.011*** −0.00 −0.27*** 0.006*** – 0.13*
Coin Flip 0.011*** 0.10 –0.07 0.002** 0.000 −0.10*
Dual Market –0.010*** −0.06 −0.10 0.002** –0.001*** 0.00
10 units. Thus, a subject at the top of this range is about 131% more likely to enter in the
Baseline treatment compared to a subject at the bottom of the range.
Risk, whether natural or strategic, severely attenuates this connection. Compared
to Baseline, the introduction of strategic risk in Shares produces a sevenfold drop in the
influence of skill. Compared to Shares, the introduction of natural risk further dilutes
the influence of skill, cutting it almost in half. Nonetheless, skill still matters in a Winner-
Take-All setting, producing an 11% difference in entry probability over the interquartile
range.
One might question whether a skilled player in the investment game is indeed
skillful overall because entry earns negative returns on average. This, however, overlooks
the variability in entry payoffs, which depend, in part, on skill. Thus, a highly skilled
subject choosing entrepreneurship will not necessarily receive the average payoff. To
illustrate this, consider the average payoff from entrepreneurship of “highly skilled” as
well as “non-highly skilled” subjects in the Winner-Take-All treatment. Define a “highly
skilled” entrepreneur as a subject who on average at least broke even in the first 25 rounds
of play (i.e., had a payoff greater or equal to 110 upon entry). Using this definition the
average payoff from entrepreneurship of “highly skilled” subjects in the last 10 rounds
equaled 113.9 whereas it equaled 103.5 for “non-highly skilled” subjects. Statistical tests
confirm that “highly-skilled’’ entrepreneurship yields comparable payoffs to the outside
option of 110.
Finally, notice that the skill coefficient changes signs in the Dual treatment, in-
dicating that individuals who are more skilled are more likely to choose the outside
option—the large prize entrepreneurship game.
Indirect measures of skill have much less predictive power and, where significant,
are associated with less entry. In particular, our numerate measure is never statisti-
cally significant though the coefficient estimates indicate the more numerate are more
likely to enter (save for the Winner-Take-All treatment). The business/econ measure
suggests a negative association of this background with entrepreneurship. Indeed, in
the Winner-Take-All treatment, a business or economics major is 27% less likely to
pursue entrepreneurship than someone without such training. Given that the ROI on
entrepreneurship is lower than the outside option in this treatment, individuals having
this background, though more skilled at the investment task, might also be better able to
recognize that entrepreneurship simply does not produce a return sufficient to expose
oneself to natural risk.
Luck also matters although the marginal effects appear to be much smaller than
the influence of skill. This, however, is deceiving. Although there is a 10-point difference
across the interquartile range of skill, there is a 50-point swing between being lucky
and unlucky in the market. Thus, the luck coefficient in the Winner-Take-All treatment
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Table VI.
Fraction of Low Bids by Entrants (Rounds 41–50)
Shares WTA Coin Flip Dual20
0.048 0.076 0.344 0.102
shows that lucky entrepreneurs are about 30% more likely to enter in the next period
compared to unlucky competitors.18
The persistent effect of luck is only present in circumstances where skill also plays
a role. When luck is completely outside of a subject’s control, as in the outside option of
the Coin Flip treatment, it has no bearing on future choices.
Finally, we consider gender. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) found that, in real effort
games, women avoided a tournament payoff structure, as in our entrepreneurship game,
even controlling for skill. Furthermore, many studies find women to be more risk averse
than men. Then again there is evidence that women exert higher efforts in contests and
bid more in different types of auctions than men (see Price and Sheremeta, 2015, and
references therein). In our data gender seems to have no consistent predictive power
across treatments. In the treatments with no natural risk (Baseline, Shares) there is no
gender effect at all. In the Winner-Take-All treatment the coefficient on female indicates
that women are 13% more likely to enter the contest compared to men, whereas in Coin
Flip they are 10% less likely to enter. Note, however, that the coin flip option associated
with staying out is, overall, the riskier alternative in this treatment (as measured by the
standard deviation of payoffs and given the actual play in the coin flip contests). Thus,
in both treatments, women are systematically pursuing the higher risk activity. Yet they
do not follow this pattern in the Dual treatment. Here, despite higher risk and return,
they do not systematically favor the high-stakes environment.
3.3. Passive Investing
Having examined entry in detail, we now turn to investment strategies. A striking aspect
of the data is the large fraction of subjects that select entrepreneurship and then make
zero or trivial investments to secure the prize. We define a “low bid” as investing 4
or less.19 Several factors might motivate such investment strategies: they could be an
attempt to signal to others to coordinate on a collusive outcome; they might reflect a
strategic judgment that returns are highest under modest investments; or they could
represent a flight from risk. Table VI displays the fraction of low bids by treatment
occurring in the final ten rounds of each session.20
Regardless of treatment, about 5% or more of choices entail low bids. Adding
risk to the outside option more than doubles this amount. Because these statistics are
for the last ten rounds (the fractions are similar for earlier rounds), we can discount
collusive explanations. In the Winner-Take-All treatment, low bidding has some merit
18. Even though success or failure is drawn independently in each round, responding to this cue is not
necessarily irrational. Because success is a combination of luck and skill, a subject experiencing success may
attribute this outcome, in part, to skill, in which case increased entry is rational. An analogous argument holds
for decreased entry following failure.
19. Our conclusions do not change if a somewhat lower or higher threshold for low versus high bids is
used.
20. In Dual we consider the fraction of low bids of both small- and large-prize contest entrants.
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as an investment strategy, earning more, on average, than the average investment made
by subjects. In Coin Flip, it breaks even whereas in all other treatments, low bidding
worsens payoffs—quite dramatically in the high stakes Dual treatment. Among low
bids, zero bids do even worse. Thus, it seems debatable that this represents a winning
investment strategy.
This leaves flight from risk as the best explanation for this pattern. This might seem
problematic for treatments like Winner-Take-All where the outside option is riskless,
but one needs to account for uncertainty about the number of entrants. For instance, an
individual might enter a winner-take-all contest early, anticipating that there will be one
or two additional entrants. If unexpectedly many individuals enter, a risk or loss averse
individual might be better served by “giving up,” that is, submitting a low bid, rather
than making the aggressive bet needed to be successful.
There is some evidence that this is the case. Conditional on submitting a low bid
in the last 10 rounds, an entrant comes in 3.5 seconds following the start of the round,
on average, and is in a group consisting of 3.1 entrepreneurs, on average. By contrast,
the average entrant choosing a regular investment comes in 8.3 seconds after the start
of the game and is in a group consisting of 2.7 entrepreneurs, on average.
4. Explaining the Findings
Compared to standard risk-neutral theory, our results present a number of puzzling
findings. Although the theory works well for the Baseline and Shares treatments, it fails
in various ways for the other treatments. Specifically, except when the winning prize is
very large, there is excess investment and entry. When the outside option is random,
additional entry occurs followed by passive investment. Finally, when the winning
prize is large, there is insufficient entry and investment relative to the Nash prediction.
A successful amendment to the model should explain all of these deviations from the
theory. We study six likely possibilities: love of winning, risk preferences, loss aversion,
over-optimism, preferences for skewness and mistakes. None of these explanations can
explain the above patterns alone. Combining two explanations, love of winning and
risk/loss aversion, can explain most of the patterns in the data. We illustrate this by
calibrating parameters of the amended model to the data and comparing the predicted
and actual entry and investments across treatments.
4.1. Love of Winning
The standard theory predicts that individuals derive payoffs in proportion to the prize
from winning the entrepreneurship game. There is, however, evidence that the mere act
of winning a competition provides rewards sufficient to induce individuals to invest.
For instance, Sheremeta (2010) reports substantial participation in a lottery contest ex-
periment with no prize. Such activity seems to indicate that individuals have a strong
intrinsic love of winning motive. Similarly, Herrmann and Orzen (2008) find evidence
consistent with a substantial love of winning motive in two-player contests. Casual in-
trospection, from observing the emotional reaction of children from winning or losing
board games to the intensity of intramural athletic competition in adulthood, suggests
pure love of winning is a powerful motivator.
We can easily incorporate love of winning by increasing the prize by a fixed
amount in settings having a unique winner. This motive explains overbidding in small
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prize winner-take-all competition, but predicts overbidding (though less so) in the large
prize competition as well, which is inconsistent with our findings. It does not explain
additional entry nor inactive bidding in the Coin Flip treatment.
4.2. Risk Preferences
Many experimental studies find that a minority of subjects exhibit risk-seeking behav-
ior even though, on average, subjects tend to be risk-averse. Amending the model to
permit risk-seeking preferences can explain the negative returns in the winner-take-all
treatment. Further amending the model to allow for heterogeneous preferences, with
some subjects exhibiting extreme risk aversion can also explain entry and subsequent
inaction in the Coin Flip treatment. However, this explanation cannot explain entry and
investment in the Dual treatment. Risk-seeking individuals should select into the large
prize setting producing overinvestment whereas risk-averse subjects should shelter in
the small prize setting and invest more cautiously. This is precisely the opposite of the
investment patterns observed in the data.
4.3. Loss Aversion
Like risk aversion, loss aversion can explain entry and subsequent inaction in the Coin
Flip treatment, but cannot explain the persistent negative return on investment from
entrepreneurship. Like risk averse individuals, loss averse players require compensation
to subject themselves to the domain of losses. Thus, loss aversion alone does a poor job
of explaining behavior.
4.4. Over-Optimism
Landier and Thesmar (2009) present evidence that entrepreneurs are over-optimistic
regarding the (future) value of their venture. In our setting, such over-optimism has
two interpretations: subjects might overestimate their utility from winning, or they
might overestimate their chances of winning. Individuals displaying excesses on ei-
ther margin should differentially sort into entrepreneurship and, misperceiving the
return on investment, overinvest. This could explain the persistent inferior returns from
entrepreneurship. But the hypothesis runs into difficulties elsewhere. First, we do not
observe consistent sorting when natural risk is present, yet sorting is the main prediction
of this explanation. Second, assuming that the simple coin flip probabilities are correctly
perceived, this hypothesis predicts no difference between Coin Flip and Winner-Take-
All because a mean preserving spread of the outside option should have no effect on
sorting or subsequent investment behavior. Instead, we observe additional entry and
decreased investment in Coin Flip compared to Winner-Take-All. Perhaps the strongest
evidence against this theory occurs in the Dual treatment. Here, overly optimistic indi-
viduals should sort into the large stakes contest, because a given degree of misperceived
winning is magnified with the stakes. Under this hypothesis, one might expect excess
entry and investment in the large stakes setting and the reverse in the small stakes
setting, but we observe precisely the opposite pattern. Thus, although this prediction
fits the large-scale finding of negative returns from entrepreneurship, it founders in its
detailed predictions.
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4.5. Preferences for Skewness
It is known that, adding probability weighting to loss aversion induces individuals to
pay a premium for lotteries exhibiting skewness.21Astebro et al. (2009) find evidence
that about 50% of subjects in their experiment exhibit these preferences. Entrepreneurs
often face positively skewed outcome lotteries relative to employment, which is also a
main feature of our experiment. Although this explanation can rationalize the persistent
low returns from entrepreneurship, it is at odds with the Dual treatment. Payoffs in
Dual (Large) are more skewed than in Dual (Small), yet there is under-entry and under-
investment in the former and the opposite behavior in the latter, suggesting that this is
not the primary driver for our findings.
4.6. Systematic Mistakes (Quantal Response Equilibrium)
Given the complexity of investing as an entrepreneur, systematic mistakes might ex-
plain the findings. Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) offers a useful formalization
of incorporating mistakes into choice models (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). Standard
formulations of these models have the property that average outcomes lie between uni-
form choices and Nash choices, with the exact location between the two determined by
the degree of bounded rationality of subjects. The reason is that, individuals with zero
rationality choose at random. As rationality increases, QRE demands that individuals
be more likely to choose more profitable than less profitable options. Because Nash be-
havior constitutes the most profitable choice, it then follows that, as rationality increases
choices increasingly favor the better (Nash) option; hence all QRE must lie between
random choices and Nash in any game with a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. For ex-
ample, in Tullock contests the QRE model predicts average investments in between the
Nash equilibrium and half the endowment (Sheremeta, 2011; Lim et al., 2013). In this
setting, the expectation of random choice is to “bid” half the endowment. Because Nash
behavior is in pure strategies, any QRE must lie between the two. This model of mistakes
can, in principle, explain overinvestment and excess entry in small prize settings.
By itself, this explanation runs into several problems. It cannot explain excess
entry in Coin Flip because entry exceeds three whereas the Nash prediction remains at
two entrants. It cannot readily accommodate the mass of inactive investors under that
treatment either. Because for our parameters the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium never
exceeds half the endowment for any number of entrants in any treatment, mistakes that
explain overinvestment when the prize is small also predict overinvestment when the
prize is large, which is at odds with the data.
These conceptual failings may be excusable were the model to fit the data reason-
ably well. We investigate this formally by computing a maximum likelihood estimate of
the bounded rationality parameter, λ . Previous research has shown that the λ parameter
varies significantly across games of differing complexity (e.g., Lim et al. (2014) estimate
different λ s for different Tullock contests that vary in the numbers of contestants, and
find that λ is significantly lower with more contestants). Thus we allow λ to differ across
various stages of the game (entry versus investment), various treatments, and various
numbers of entrants.
No standard implementation of QRE exists for continuous time games such as our
entry stage. Therefore, we assume an exogenous sequential order of entry where each
21. See, e.g., Barberis and Thaler (2003).
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subject determines whether to enter based on the current “state” of the game (i.e., the
order of entry and the number of previous entrants) as well as expectations about the
profitability and final number of entrants. We assume that these payoff beliefs are equal
to the empirical average payoff conditional on reaching an investment game consisting
of precisely k + 1 entrants under a given treatment.22 Beliefs about the final number of
entrants depend on the state as well as equilibrium entry propensities under QRE.
To illustrate this approach, consider a simplified version of the game where there
are only two possible entrants. When the second player chooses to enter, there is either
zero or one previous entrant, that is, k = 0 or k = 1 . Conditional on this, the en-
trant calculates the payoff from entry compared with that from non-entry and chooses
the more profitable of the two probabilistically according to the standard logistic QRE
specification:
Pr [enter ] = p (k, 2) =
eλpi(k+1)
eλpi(k+1) + eλpi0
,
where pi (k + 1) is the average profit when k + 1 entrants compete, pi0 indicates the
payoffs from not pursuing entrepreneurship, and p(k, 2) denotes the probability of
entry for the second player when there are k previous entrants. In the first period of the
game, k = 0 because no one has yet entered, and the entry propensity calculation is
Pr [enter ] = p (0, 1) =
p (1, 2) eλpi(2) + (1− p (1, 2))eλpi(1)
p (1, 2) eλpi(2) + (1− p (1, 2))eλpi(1) + eλpi0
.
Notice that the payoffs from entry in this stage account for the fact that, if player
1 enters, then the second player enters with probability p(1, 2) . For a given value of
λ , a QRE is a fixed point in state contingent entry probabilities. It may be readily shown
that such a fixed point exists though it is not necessarily unique.
The experimental data consist of groups of six potential entrants, making this
branching process considerably more involved but not conceptually different from the
two-player setting. To estimate λ associated with entry decisions, we compare the
predicted distribution of the realized number of entrants with the empirical distribution
using a log likelihood statistic whose value we maximize. We perform this estimation
procedure separately for each treatment.
Because investment choices are simultaneous, the process of estimating the QRE
model is more straightforward. For computational efficiency reasons, we divide invest-
ments into 21 bins consisting of investment levels 0–5, 6–10, etc. and treat these bins as
the relevant strategy space.23 A QRE is a fixed point in probabilities of investing in each
of these bins, again using the logistic function to determine investment probabilities.
For a given treatment and number of entrants, we choose λ to maximize a log like-
lihood statistic comparing the predicted distribution of investments with the empirical
distribution. This procedure yields estimates of the bounded rationality parameter for
each treatment and each number of entrants.
22. The cases of a single entrant and six entrants do not occur in the data. Because subjects were informed
that a single entrant would simply receive the prize without having to make post-entry investments, we use
this outcome as the relevant expected payoff. For the case of six entrants we use Nash equilibrium to determine
expected payoffs. Although this may not correspond to actual beliefs, our estimates are robust to a variety
of other approaches including assuming that the expected payoff equals zero, the amount any player can
guarantee him- or herself in this situation.
23. The bin structure addresses a common feature of choice data, the over-representation of choices that
are multiples of five. Were we instead to treat each choice separately, the resulting log-likelihood estimates
would be problematic owing to lack of data in many cells.
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Table VII.
Entry and Investment Behavior—Last 10 Rounds: QRE vs.
Actual
Normalized Investment
Entry Investment − Prize/Entrants
Treatment λ Predicted Actual λ 24 Predicted Actual
Shares 0.53 1.9 2.1 0.3 –10.4 –9.5
WTA 0.06 2.4 2.5 0.2 –5.7 –4.4
Coin Flip 0.00 3 3.9 0.25 –0.8 –4.6
Dual (Small) 0.02 2.4 2.6 0.2 –5.1 –5.8
Dual (Large) 0.02 3.6 3.4 0.01 –10.3 –20.8
By estimating rationality parameters for investment separate from entry, we allow
the degree of bounded rationality to vary between stages of the same treatment. We
compute the estimates for investment independently of the entry estimates and, in
determining the predicted ROI from entrepreneurship, use the empirical rather than
predicted distribution of entry. Both of these strategies bias the analysis in favor of
fitting the QRE model.
Table VII reports the resulting QRE estimates and compares the predicted versus
actual number of entrants and normalized investment levels for each treatment. Because
Baseline mainly conforms to Nash equilibrium and entails no investments, we do not
apply the QRE model to this treatment.
The most striking aspect of the analysis is the low value of the λ estimates for
entry. They imply that approximately random choice, rather than intent, drives most of
the observed variation. The reason is that, when the prize is small, we observe excess
entry compared to equilibrium. Because the QRE predictions lie between Nash levels
and three entrants (under purely random choice), fitting this pattern requires lowering
the rationality parameter. The situation is worsened by the significantly lower ROI from
entrepreneurship than the outside option. Thus, to obtain even modest amounts of excess
entry requires extremely low values of λ because mistakes in the direction of entry are
quite costly. Thus, the model ascribes excess entry mainly to large decision errors, that is,
random choice. It may be the case that the low rationality parameters of the fitted QRE
model reflects the particular simplification of the entry game with exogenously ordered
sequential entry. However, it should be noted that other entry specifications would also
have to capture the same pattern of costly excess entry decisions. In particular, data
from the Coin Flip treatment, where more than 50% of subjects enter, will be difficult
to reconcile with QRE predictions, which predict less than 50% entry for any rationality
parameter.
Turning to investments, because the QRE is a symmetric model, it struggles to fit the
passive investing behavior in the Coin Flip and Dual (Large) treatments. This partially
explains the large discrepancy between the predicted and actual normalized investment
amounts for these treatments. In the Dual (Large) treatment, the model also struggles
to explain under-investment by entrants. As with entry, accounting for “mistakes” of
this magnitude forces the model to ascribe these investment choices to approximately
random behavior. Even here, it misses the ROI from this path by about 50%. In short,
24. λ estimates were derived conditional on treatment and number of entrants. Here we report average λ s
weighted by the empirical distribution of entry rather than the entry patterns predicted by the entry estimates.
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there is simply no value of λ capable of producing investment behavior with the ROI
we observe in the Dual (Large) treatment.
One view of λ is that it captures the cognitive complexity of the treatment. Taking
the ratio of the λ estimates for Dual (Small) and Dual (Large), the estimates imply that
the large prize game is 20 times as complex as the small prize game!
One objection to the above analysis is that we have biased the model against
obtaining a good fit by assuming symmetric behavior despite the presence of passive
investors. To address this objection, we also estimated an amended form of the QRE
model that excludes these individuals. There are two types, active and inactive, in
the amended model. Inactive players simply choose low investment levels, and we
exclude them from the equilibrium analysis. We then apply the QRE solutions only
to active players, re-estimating the λ parameter for investments on this subset of the
data. The resulting estimates display only small differences compared to those in Table
VII. The amended model continues to struggle to explain underinvestment in the Dual
(Large) treatment, still attributing choice behavior to randomness.
Although the QRE model can explain certain patterns in the data, such as excess
entry, it struggles with other aspects, such as underinvestment in the large prize market.
Moreover, to explain excess entry requires extremely low values of λ . Indeed, the
resulting estimates imply something very close to random choices. This is hardly a
satisfying resolution of the discrepancies between the empirical findings and equilibrium
predictions, nor consistent with the systematic changes in behavior one observes as the
treatments vary.
4.7. Summary
To conclude, adding a single additional factor to the model is insufficient to explain the
range of anomalous patterns we observe. In particular, entry and investment in the Dual
contest remain a vexing problem, as does inactivity in the Coin Flip treatment. Most
amendments can explain one or the other of these features in the data, but none can
explain both.
4.8. Two-Factor Explanations
With these limitations in mind, we turn to two-factor explanations. Some combinations
of the above set of alternatives add little incremental explanatory power despite their
apparent promise. For instance, we re-estimated the QRE model as above but with the
addition of loss aversion. Following the model of Morgan and Sisak (2015), we postulate
a gain/loss payoff structure where gains and losses relative to the reference point r were
linear with a coefficient equal to 1 for gains and α > 1 for losses. This reflects the key
feature that a monetary loss is more painful than an equivalent gain is pleasurable. We
chose α = 2 as values close to two have been consistently found in different laboratory
experiments measuring loss aversion (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1992, or Abdellaoui
et al., 2007). The results, available upon request from the authors, show slightly improved
predictions, but overall leave Table VII largely unchanged. QRE continues to attribute
the underinvestment and under entry in the large prize competition to random behavior
rather than intent.
Our preferred two-factor explanation combines love of winning with heteroge-
neous loss/risk aversion. We postulate that individuals receive a payoff B from win-
ning the investment game, irrespective of the size of the prize. In addition, individuals
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differ in their loss/risk aversion parameter αi . Formally, individual i ’s gain/loss utility
function in becoming an entrepreneur with one or more rivals is:
Ui =
{
W + Rs + B − xi − r if i wins
αi (W − xi − r ) if i loses,
where W is the initial endowment, Rs is the size of the prize, which depends on the
entrepreneurship setting (i.e., small prize or large prize), B is the love of winning payoff
accruing to the winner, xi is i ’s investment, and r is the reference point, which we
assume is equal to the secure payoff, so r = W when the outside option exhibits natural
risk and r = W + w otherwise. The parameter w represents the value of the outside
option, in our experiment w = 10.25 The loss aversion parameter αi {αL, αH}, where
αH > αL > 1 , differs by individual. For reasons that will become clear, we assume that
nH = 1 individuals are highly loss averse whereas the remainder have low(er) loss
aversion. Other than the addition of love of winning, the model is identical to Morgan
and Sisak (2015).26
Under the assumption that the love-of-winning motive does not operate in our
Baseline treatment (where there is no contest) or Shares treatment (where there is no
simple winner/loser), and given that there is no natural risk in the Baseline or Shares
treatments, the predictions of our two-factor model for these treatments are identical to
the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium.
Predictions for the other treatments are affected, however, and as we shall see
these two factors are sufficient to explain the qualitative features of the data. Love of
winning motives predominates in the small prize contest, producing overinvestment and
excess entry. Loss aversion motives predominate in the large prize contest producing
underinvestment and too little entry. Highly loss-averse individuals opt out of the coin
flip in favor of the safe harbor of inactivity in the contest.
The two-factor model can also explain quantitative features of the data. To show
this, we calibrated the parameters of the model to the data. Unlike the QRE estimates,
here we do not allow the model parameters to vary across the entry and investment
stages of the game. In addition, we do not allow the love of winning motive to vary with
the number of competitors. For instance, it might be the case that subjects derive greater
pleasure from having defeated a larger group of entrepreneurs rather than a smaller
group. Both of these conservative strategies make it harder for the model to fit the data.
The two-factor model has three parameters, B, αL, and αH. Because, on average,
about one subject per group is an inactive entrant in the Coin Flip treatment, we assume
that exactly one individual has high loss aversion whereas the remaining five have low
loss aversion. Obtaining a precise value for αH is not needed for the analysis. It suffices
merely to ensure that αH is sufficiently high that entry followed by inactivity is such
an individual’s best response in the Coin Flip treatment. It may be readily shown that,
25. If the reference point were constant across treatments, our loss averse specification is isomorphic to a
particular specification of risk aversion and thus, in that sense, one can be agnostic about the two explanations.
Specifically, we can define preferences based solely on ending wealth states and assume that preferences exhibit
a kink that occurs at the point where an individual’s wealth at the end of a period is exactly r. When fitting the
model to the data, we vary the reference point with natural risk in the outside option. Thus, the fitted model is
not isomorphic to risk aversion. Forcing the reference point to be identical across treatments worsens model
fit.
26. We suppose that when only one contestant enters her utility does not include a joy-of-winning term.
Adding a joy-of-winning term in this case would have a negligible effect on our results as there are very few
cases where only one subject enters. Also, we suppose that the joy-of-winning motive does not operate in our
Baseline or Shares treatment.
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provided αH > 2.24, this is the case. Relative to parameter estimates of loss aversion in
the extant literature, this value is above average, as one would expect, but not so high as
to be inconsistent with the notion that 1/6th of the population might have such a value.
To estimate B and αL, we use a quadratic scoring rule giving equal weight to
each treatment and equal weight to investment and entry. To score entry, we compute
the squared difference between the gain/loss utility from not entering and that from
entering, using the formula for expected payoffs in a symmetric loss-averse equilibrium
derived in Morgan and Sisak (2015).27
Given n entrants, all entrants invest up to the point where the marginal benefit,
the increased chance of winning multiplied by the associated utility from this event
(measured in gain/loss space) equals the marginal cost of investment, again measured
in gain/loss space. The precise amount of equilibrium investment (and hence associated
gain/loss payoffs) depends on the equilibrium number of entrants, which we took to be
the average number of active entrants of a given treatment computed over the last ten
rounds of play, nt. The investment score consists of the squared difference between the
predicted investment in a symmetric equilibrium and the average investments of active
entrepreneurs (i.e., those investing 5 or more tokens) using data from the last 10 rounds
of the game. Because the number of active entrants varies, we used data from (a) the
integer floor and (b) the integer ceiling of average active entrants to score investment,
weighting each condition by the observed frequency of decisions.
To be precise about our estimation procedure, letXFL(nt) be the estimated investment
among active players under treatment t when the number of active entrepreneurs takes
the value of the integer floor of nt and xFL(nt) denote the average investment from active
players in the data under this same condition. Let XCE(nt) and xCE(nt) be analogously
defined for the integer ceiling ofnt.. Letφt denote the fraction of integer floor observations
under treatment t conditional on all floor or ceiling observations under this treatment.
Finally, let Ut be the estimated gain loss utility from the entrepreneurship game among
the average number of active players in the data and ut the outside option expressed in
gain loss utility terms. The calibrated values of B and αL solve:
28
min
∑
t ∈T
φt
(
XF L(nt) − xFL(nt)
)2
+ (1− φt)
(
XCE(nt) − xCE(nt)
)2
+ (Ut − ut)
2.
One difficulty with this scoring rule is that it applies the same score to different
units of measure. Thus, we divide by xt (resp. ut) to obtain the scoring rule:
29
min
∑
t ∈T
φt
(
XF L(nt)
xFL(nt)
− 1
)2
+ (1− φt)
(
XCE(nt)
xCE(nt)
− 1
)2
+
(
Ut
ut
− 1
)2
.
27. In the Dual treatment, we computed the expected gain/loss utility from entering the large prize versus
the small prize contest, respectively. The expression for gain/loss utility as a function of the number of entrants
n and the reference point r equals EU(n, r ) = Rs+B+(W−r )((n−1)αi+1)
2
(2n−1)+αi (n−1)
2 as derived in Morgan and Sisak (2015).
Recall that Rs equals the prize value, B the utility of winning, W the initial endowment, and αi the degree of
loss aversion. Equilibrium investment in a symmetric equilibrium equals xi (n, r ) =
(n−1)(Rs+B+(αi−1)(r−W))
(2n−1)+αi (n−1)
2 .
28. The Dual contest must be handled slightly differently. Because it consists of investments in small and
large prize contests, we treat these investments as separate scores, each given half the weight compared to
the other treatments. Also, the utility comparison compares payoffs in small versus large contests rather than
against the outside option.
29. Because ut is endogenous in the Dual contest, we divide by the theoretical value of the outside option,
10 in this case.
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Table VIII.
Entry and Investment Behavior—Last 10 Rounds: Actual vs.
Joy of Winning plus Loss Aversion (B = 25.5, αL = 1.48)
Normalized Investment Investment-
Active Entry Prize/(Active Entrants)
Treatment Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
Baseline 2 2.3 – –
Shares 2 2 –10 -8.2
WTA 2.2 2.3 –6.1 –4.3
Coin Flip 3.1 2.6 –5.5 –7.4
Dual (Small) 2.0 2.3 –7.1 –6.3
Dual (Large) 3.4 3.1 –24.9 –22.9
This procedure yields parameter estimates of B = 25.5 and αL = 1.48, which both
appear reasonable in view of the extant literature and the size of the prize.30 Our loss
aversion estimate is lower than 2, the usual rule of thumb when calibrating loss aversion
in models, but within the range found in other studies.31 Recall that αL represents a lower
bound on loss aversion in the population. Average loss aversion in the population weighs
both αL and αH. Because αH is a partially free parameter in the estimation (constrained
only to exceed 2.24), the population, the population average can be set to any value
above αL.
Our love of winning estimate increases the perceived value of winning the small
prize contest by about 50% but increases the perceived prize value by only 13% in the
large prize contest. By way of comparison, performing a similar analysis using the data
contained in Sheremeta (2010) for his treatment where no prize was offered in a contest,
produces an estimate of B = 262, about ten times as large as in our setting.32 There are
many differences between the two experiments, but perhaps the most important is that
Sheremeta publicly announced the identity of the winning contestant whereas we do
not. This announcement presumably enhances the perceived prestige value of winning.
In addition, subjects in Sheremeta only played the game once whereas our subjects
experience 50 iterations. This repetition might cool their ardor for winning.
Because we used the number of passive entrants in the data to deduce the fraction of
αH types in the population as well as to determine the threshold value of αH, we derived
our estimates only from the population of active entrants. As such, we restrict attention
to this population in assessing the performance of the model. Table VIII compares actual
and predicts active entry and normalized investment (dividing by the number of active
entrants) using our estimates.
The calibrated model produces predicted entry that is reasonably close to what we
observe in all treatments save for Coin Flip, where it predicts too much entry. The model
30. One obtains similar figures using an unweighted scoring rule: B = 25.2 and αL = 1.42. The resulting
estimated investments and participation are also similar.
31. For instance, Schmidt and Traub (2002) report an average loss aversion coefficient of 1.43.
32. To make this calculation, we determined the implied value of the prize under equilibrium play in
a contest consisting of four players making the average contribution based on Sheremeta’s data. We then
converted this implied value, using the exchange rates from both experiments, into comparable point values
in our setting. Detailed calculations are available upon request.
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also explains the pattern of under entry in the Dual treatment, large prize setting, which
stems from loss aversion and the attenuation of love of winning motives.
The estimates for the ROI from entrepreneurship tend to be higher than what is
observed save for Coin Flip. Investment in the two factor model only depends on the
number of entrants and the reference point. Thus, the ROI under Coin Flip is lower than
Dual (Small) owing to greater entry. A higher reference point reduces ROI, all else equal,
because investments become more aggressive to secure gains. This explains why the
ROI under Winner-Take-All is lower than Dual (Small).
The discrepancies between the predicted and actual ROI stem mainly from the
heterogeneity of investment amounts across treatments, even after controlling for the
reference point and number of active entrepreneurs. Because we estimate one love of
winning and loss aversion parameter applied to all treatments, compromises in fit are
inevitable. Especially noteworthy is investment under Coin Flip compared to the other
treatments. The model assumes that the number of passive investors is known whereas,
in reality, this is unlikely. Because passive investors play a major role in Coin Flip, the
result is that actual investment is more conservative than the model predicts producing
an underestimate for ROI for that treatment and overestimates for the other treatments.
The broader lesson here is that, not only are behavioral motives needed to explain
the patterns in the data, but these motives must be heterogeneous and countervailing.
Love of winning motive spurs entry and investment, with a larger effect in the small
prize contest. At the same time, loss/risk aversion pushes in the opposite direction. This
opposing force is needed to explain the influx of passive investors in Coin Flip as well
as conservative entry and investment in the large prize Dual treatment.
Such a mix of motives seems plausible, but the explanation suffers from being
post hoc with no out of sample testing. Fortunately, sharp out of sample predictions are
available. For instance, raising the value of the prize in the Winner-Take-All treatment
should reduce overinvestment by diluting the love of winning motive. In earlier work,
Morgan et al. (2012), we observed precisely this pattern. When the outcome of the
entrepreneurship game is more sensitive to relative investments, this increases risk and
hence should reduce overinvestment. Publicly announcing or otherwise recognizing the
winner of the game should increase overinvestment by making love of winning more
salient. These last two treatments separately test the two motives out of sample, but
remain for further research.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
The decision to become an entrepreneur is fraught with peril. One risk that entrepreneurs
face, what we term strategic risk, stems from the interactive nature of payoffs—an
entrepreneur’s fate is not solely under her control, but rather depends on the strategy
decisions of rivals in the same market. Natural risk also plays a key role. Despite her best
efforts, an entrepreneur’s success or failure is determined by the whims of fate. Random
fluctuations in tastes, fads, and fashions are often the difference between a winning
venture and a losing one.
Using laboratory experiments, we isolate these two types of risk and examine
their effects on entry and investment. Our setting also allows us to observe the “life
cycle” of entrepreneurism—how choices and strategies evolve as an entrepreneur gains
experience in the market.
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In settings primarily characterized by strategic risk, standard economic theory per-
forms well in predicting the entry and investment decisions of entrepreneurs. Although
payoffs from entrepreneurship are initially depressed compared to the returns from a
safe outside option, with experience, individuals sort themselves into entrepreneur and
non-entrepreneur groups. Because there are no barriers to switching between groups, it
is hardly surprising that the expected payoffs between the two groups approximately
equalize.
Adding natural risk to the setting changes matters considerably. Individuals are
now slightly more inclined to pursue entrepreneurship and much more inclined to
invest aggressively post-entry. This depresses the returns from entrepreneurship to the
point where they badly lag those from an outside option, regardless of whether it is
safe or risky. Even with experience, these returns differences persist. Our experiment
thus nicely complements the empirical findings of Hamilton (2000), showing that the
pecuniary returns to entrepreneurship are negative.
We do observe an important exception to this pattern however: When subjects
are required to pursue entrepreneurship and can only control the stakes of the game in
which they are participating, we find little appetite for risk. Compared to the risk-neutral
prediction, too few subjects opt for the high stakes path and those that do invest less
aggressively than theory predicts. This produces the largest returns difference between
the two alternatives among all our treatments—more than 15 percentage points.
We can explain these patterns in the data through a combination of loss aversion
and a non-pecuniary love of winning motive, inspired by the findings of Sheremeta
(2010). Love of winning helps explain the lagging returns to entrepreneurship in low
stakes settings whereas loss aversion explains the conservative entry and investing in
high stakes settings. Allowing for heterogeneity in loss aversion additionally explains
passive investing in the face of a risky outside option.
Natural risk also reduces the sorting of individuals into entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs. In effect, entrepreneurship becomes a revolving door. Those who enter
and are unlucky leave only to be replaced by individuals previously on the sidelines
now willing to take a chance. Lucky entrepreneurs, on the other hand, remain in the
market, and seem to confuse luck for skill in this setting. These results are consistent
with the empirical findings of Mazzeo (2004) who notes that, in riskier settings, there is
less specialization between the entrepreneur and non-entrepreneur classes.
Entrepreneurship is widely viewed as a key national growth driver and, indeed,
many countries have policies put into place to reward this activity. Our findings shed
light on some aspects of these policies. First, for small stakes entrepreneurship, the
problem may be one of too much rather than too few. The combination of too lit-
tle specialization, too much entry, and too aggressive a level of investment may well
prove socially wasteful rather than socially beneficial. In large stakes settings, the oppo-
site problem arises and here policy can clearly help. In effect, our subjects are somewhat
capital constrained in entering markets with large prizes. They have no ability to hedge
or offset their risk and, to be successful, they need to wager a significant portion of their
endowment. Our results suggest that initiatives designed to create liquidity and offset
some risk could prove beneficial.
Of course, there is a vast gulf between the much simplified entrepreneurial set-
tings we study in the lab and real-world entrepreneurship. Nonetheless, laboratory
settings are crucial in understanding reactions to different sources of risk and bench-
marking relative to the predictions of economic models. Thus, we view our findings as
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informative, but hardly the last word, on strategic and natural risk and their effect on
entrepreneurship.
Appendix A
Instructions for the Experiment
Welcome! You are about to take part in an experiment in the economics of decision
making. You will be paid in private and in cash at the end of the experiment. The amount
you earn will depend on your decisions, so please follow the instructions carefully.
It is important that you do not talk to any of the other participants until the
experiment is over. If you have a question at any time, raise your hand and someone
will come to your desk to answer it.
The experiment will consist of 50 rounds. In each round you will be matched
with the same five other participants, randomly selected from the people in this room.
Together, the six of you form a group. Note that you will not learn who the other members
of your group are, neither during nor after today’s session.
Each round is identical. At the beginning of the round you will be given an initial
point balance of 100 points. You will then have up to 15 seconds to decide between option
A and option B. If, at the end of that time, you have not made a choice, then the computer
will make a choice for you by selecting randomly between the two options. During the
15 seconds, your computer screen will keep you informed of how many group members
have chosen each of the options so far, as well as the time remaining for you to make
a choice. At the end of the 15 seconds the computer will display your choice and the
number of group members choosing each option. Your final point earnings for the round
will depend on your choice and the choices of other group members as described below.
At the end of the experiment one of the 50 rounds will be selected at random. Your
earnings from the experiment will depend on your final point earnings in this randomly
selected round. The final point earnings will be converted into cash at a rate of 10p per
point.
Option A
[Baseline, Shares, Winner-Take-All: If you select option A, 10 points will be added to
your point balance. Your final point earnings for the round will be 110 points.]
[Coin Flip: If you select option A, your final point earnings for the round will depend
on the outcome of a computerized coin flip. The coin is equally likely to come up heads
or tails. If the coin comes up heads 35 points will be added to your initial point balance
and your final point earnings for the round will be 135 points; if the coin comes up tails
15 points will be subtracted from your initial point balance and your final point earnings
for the round will be 85 points.]
[Dual Market: If you select option A you will have a chance to win a prize of 200 points.
First, if you are the only group member to select option A, you will automatically
win the prize, and 200 points will be added to your initial point balance. Your final point
earnings for the round will be 300 points.
Second, if more than one group member selects option A there will be a contest
among these group members to determine who wins the prize. In this contest the players
first decide how many “contest tokens” to buy. Each contest token you buy reduces your
point balance by 1 point. You can purchase up to 100 of these tokens. Everybody will be
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making this decision at the same time, so you will not know how many contest tokens
the other players have bought when you make your choice. You will have 30 seconds to
make a decision about how many contest tokens to buy. If you do not make a decision
within this time limit the computer will make a choice for you by selecting zero tokens.
If nobody buys any tokens, nobody wins the prize. Otherwise, your chances of
winning the prize will depend on how many contest tokens you buy and how many
contest tokens the other players buy. This works as follows:
A computerized lottery wheel will be divided into shares with different colors.
One share belongs to you and the other shares belong to each of the other players (a
different color for each player). The size of your share on the lottery wheel is an exact
representation of the number of contest tokens you bought relative to all contest tokens
purchased. For instance, if you own just as many contest tokens as all the other players
put together, your share will make up 50% of the lottery wheel. In another example,
suppose that there are four players (including you) and that each of you owns the same
number of contest tokens: in that case your share will make up 25% of the lottery wheel.
Once the shares of the lottery wheel have been determined, the wheel will start to
rotate and after a short while it will stop at random. Just above the lottery wheel there
is an indicator at the 12 o’clock position. The indicator will point at one of the shares,
and the player owning that share will win the prize. Thus, your chances of winning the
prize increase with the number of contest tokens you buy. Conversely, the more contest
tokens the other players buy, the lower your chances of receiving the prize.
If you win the prize 200 points will be added to your point balance. Your final
point earnings for the round will be (100 – the number of contest tokens you bought +
200) points.
If another player wins the prize zero points will be added to your point balance.
Your final point earnings for the round will be (100 – the number of contest tokens you
bought) points.]
Option B
[Baseline: If you select option B you will receive some additional points depending on
how many players choose option B.
If you are the only group member to select option B 50 points will be added to your
initial point balance. Your final point earnings for the round will be 150 points.
If you and one other group member selects option B 13 points will be added to
your initial point balance. Your final point earnings for the round will be 113 points.
If you and two other group members select option B 6 points will be added to your
initial point balance. Your final point earnings for the round will be 106 points.
If you and three other group members select option B 3 points will be added to
your initial point balance. Your final point earnings for the round will be 103 points.
If you and four other group member selects option B 2 points will be added to your
initial point balance. Your final point earnings for the round will be 102 points.
If you and five other group member selects option B 1 point will be added to your
initial point balance. Your final point earnings for the round will be 101 points].
[Shares: If you select option B you can receive a share of a prize of 50 points.
First, if you are the only group member to select option B, you will automatically
receive all of the prize, and 50 points will be added to your initial point balance. Your
final point earnings for the round will be 150 points.
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Second, if more than one group member selects option B there will be a contest
among these group members to determine how the prize is shared. In this contest the
players first decide how many “contest tokens” to buy. Each contest token you buy
reduces your point balance by 1 point. You can purchase up to 100 of these tokens.
Everybody will be making this decision at the same time, so you will not know how
many contest tokens the other players have bought when you make your choice. You
will have 30 seconds to make a decision about how many contest tokens to buy. If
you do not make a decision within this time limit the computer will make a choice for
you by selecting zero tokens.
If nobody buys any tokens, nobody receives any of the prize. Otherwise, your share
of the prize will equal your share of all tokens bought times 50 points, rounded to the
nearest point.
For example, if all players (including you) bought a total of 100 tokens and you
bought 25 of these your share of all tokens bought is 25%. Your share of the prize is 25%
of 50 points or 12.5 points, which is rounded to 13 points.
Thus, your share of the prize increases with the number of contest tokens you buy.
Conversely, the more contest tokens the other players buy, the lower will be your share
of the prize.
Your share of the prize will be added to your point balance. Your final point
earnings for the round will be (100 – the number of contest tokens you bought + your
share of the prize) points.]
[Winner-Take-All, Coin Flip: If you select option B you will have a chance to win a
prize of 50 points.
First, if you are the only group member to select option B, you will automatically
win the prize, and 50 points will be added to your initial point balance. Your final point
earnings for the round will be 150 points.
Second, if more than one group member selects option B there will be a contest
among these group members to determine who wins the prize. In this contest the players
first decide how many “contest tokens” to buy. Each contest token you buy reduces your
point balance by 1 point. You can purchase up to 100 of these tokens. Everybody will be
making this decision at the same time, so you will not know how many contest tokens
the other players have bought when you make your choice. You will have 30 seconds to
make a decision about how many contest tokens to buy. If you do not make a decision
within this time limit the computer will make a choice for you by selecting zero tokens.
If nobody buys any tokens, nobody wins the prize. Otherwise, your chances of
winning the prize will depend on how many contest tokens you buy and how many
contest tokens the other players buy. This works as follows:
A computerized lottery wheel will be divided into shares with different colors.
One share belongs to you and the other shares belong to each of the other players (a
different color for each player). The size of your share on the lottery wheel is an exact
representation of the number of contest tokens you bought relative to all contest tokens
purchased. For instance, if you own just as many contest tokens as all the other players
put together, your share will make up 50% of the lottery wheel. In another example,
suppose that there are four players (including you) and that each of you owns the same
number of contest tokens: in that case your share will make up 25% of the lottery wheel.
Once the shares of the lottery wheel have been determined, the wheel will start to
rotate and after a short while it will stop at random. Just above the lottery wheel there
is an indicator at the 12 o’clock position. The indicator will point at one of the shares,
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and the player owning that share will win the prize. Thus, your chances of winning the
prize increase with the number of contest tokens you buy. Conversely, the more contest
tokens the other players buy, the lower your chances of receiving the prize.
If you win the prize 50 points will be added to your point balance. Your final point
earnings for the round will be (100 – the number of contest tokens you bought + 50)
points.
If another player wins the prize zero points will be added to your point balance.
Your final point earnings for the round will be (100 – the number of contest tokens you
bought) points.]
[Dual Market: If you select option B you will have a chance to win a prize of 50
points.
First, if you are the only group member to select option B, you will automatically
win the prize, and 50 points will be added to your point balance. Your final point earnings
for the round will be 150 points.
Second, if more than one group member selects option B there will be a contest to
determine who wins the prize. This contest works in the same way as that described for
option A, except that the prize is 50 points.]
Now, please look at your computer screen and begin making your decisions. If
you have a question at any time please raise your hand and a monitor will come to your
desk to answer it.
Appendix B
A Model of Continuous Time Entry
There are N potential entrepreneurs in the game. Each individual chooses to either enter
or not enter into entrepreneurship. This decision is made once, and cannot be changed
over the course of the game, which occurs during the time interval [0,T]. Each individual
i has a private awareness time, ri, drawn independently (in each round) from a common
atomless distribution Fwith support [0,ε],where T>ε>0 is some small value. Awareness
time represents the period at the start of the game where an individual’s attention is
elsewhere. Formally, at any time t<ri, an individual is unaware that the game has begun
and can make no decision about entry or exit. Once t ri, individual i is fully aware of
the state variable, n(t), the number of individuals entering up to time t, and can execute
her entry/exit decision instantaneously at time t.
We parameterize the preferences of each agent i by a type θ i, which is increasing
in i. An agent knows her own type and the set of all realized types (i.e., that there exists
some agent j with type θ j).
33 The type θ i represents the degree of risk or loss aversion of
an individual. Individuals with higher types are more risk/loss averse than those with
lower types, that is, for all i<j, θ i <θ j.
Let C denote the list of index numbers of all those individuals who entered at time
T.34 For each agent i  C, let C-i denote the indices of her competitors. Suppose that i 
C, then pi i(C) is the payoff lottery that i receives when with others j  C. Agent i derives
33. This assumption is essentially the same as the more usual condition that an individual knows her own
type and the distribution from which all other types are drawn (rather than the realizations of these draws)
provided that n is large.
34. Note that such a list is not directly observable to any agent because she only knows the time of each
entrant (after the inattention period has elapsed) but not the index number. Nonetheless, in certain equilibria,
she will be able to perfectly anticipate the index numbers contained on the list C.
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expected utility U(pi i(C);θ i) from this payoff lottery. When i chooses not to enter, her
expected utility is U(pin;θ i). Let V(pi i(C);θ i) = U(pi i(C);θ i)-U(pin;θ i), that is, V represents
the utility difference between entry and exit (given other entrants’ indices). Because this
difference is the relevant comparison for all choices, we describe everything in terms of
V in the analysis that follows.
Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee that the entry game is "interesting" in the sense that
it is valuable enough to be worth contesting but not so valuable that everyone prefers to
enter. Formally,
Assumption 1(Viability): For some i,j V(pi k({i,j});θ k) > 0, where k  {i,j}.
Assumption 2(Congestibility): For all i, V(pi i(N);θ i) < 0.
Assumption 3 merely ensures that greater competition reduces utility for all en-
trants.
Assumption 3(Competition): For all i  C and any j  C, V(pi i(C);θ i) > V(pi i(C{j});θ i).
As described above, individuals are ordered by their type θ . The following condi-
tion describes the meaning of this ordering:
Condition 1: For all C with i  C, it holds that:
(1) V(pi i(C);θ i)  V(pi i(C-j{k});θ i) for all k<j where j  C and k  C, that is, an
individual’s net utility from entry is higher when competing with "weaker" players.
(2) V(pi i(C);θ i)  V(pi j(C-i{j});θ j) for j  C where i<j. A "weaker" player receives a
lower net utility from entry against a given set of competitors.
To proceed, it is convenient to denote the case where i competes against the n-1
strongest competitors by writing C-i = n-i. For example when i>n-1, then n-i = {1,2, . . . ,n-
1}. Using this notation, define the threshold market size for individual i as the unique set
n-i  {i} solving
V(pii (n−i ∪ {i}); θi ) ≥ 0.
V(pii ((n+ 1)−i ∪ {i}); θi ) < 0.
where uniqueness follows immediately from Assumptions 1–3. Using this value of n-i,
we say that the largest size market i is willing to face is ni
 = n-i  {i}, which has a
cardinality of
#ni
 = #[n-i  {i}].
One can think of #ni
 as representing the "demand curve" for entry, that is, it
expresses the highest "price" in terms of the amount of competition that i is willing to
"pay" to enter. We next show that Condition 1 implies that this demand curve slopes
downward. Formally,
Lemma 1: Let #ni
 be defined as above. Provided Condition 3 holds, then #ni
 is weakly
decreasing in i.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that, for some j>i, #nj
>#ni
. There are several cases
to consider
a) jnj
: By Part (1) of Condition 1, V(pi i(nj
);θ i)  V(pi i(nj
\{j}{i});θ i) where
we have created a "duplicate" of i in the set nj
\{j}{i}. Part (2) of Condition 3 implies
V(pi i(nj
\{j}{i});θ i)V(pi j(nj
);θ j) 0. Hence,V(pi i(nj
);θ i) 0, which is a contradiction.
b) i<nj
k<j: Because V(pi j(nj
);θ j)  0, then if we replace j by k, it must still be
the case that V(pi k(nj
\{j}{k});θ k)  0 because k<j. Finally, notice that, from the perspec-
tive of i, n j
∗\{ j} ∪ {k} = n−i ∪ {i}, where n−i = {1, 2, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , k − 1, k} and,
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because i < k, thenV(pii (n−i ∪ {i}); θi ) ≥ V(pik(n j
∗\{ j} ∪ {k}); θk) ≥ 0, which is a contra-
diction.
c) inj
: Part (2) of Condition 3 impliesV(pii (n j
∗); θi ) ≥ V(pii (n j
∗\{ j} ∪ {i}); θi ) ≥
V(pi j (n j
∗); θ j ) ≥ 0, which is a contradiction.
An equilibrium, n, is the unique value of i such that #ni
i and #ni+1
<i+1.
Uniqueness follows from the fact that the sequence of indices, {i,i+1, . . . }, is strictly
increasing in i although the sequence #ni
 is weakly decreasing. We now relate n to the
number of entrants. There are two cases to consider depending on whether "demand" is
rationed or not.
Non-contested entry: Suppose that, for all i>n, #ni
<n. In this case, the
"strongest" n individuals enter with probability one and all others never enter. Be-
cause there is no "excess demand" at n, entry can occur at any time—individuals do
not need to react quickly to ensure themselves a slot in the contest.
Of course, excess demand at n is entirely possible. Because demand is only weakly
downward sloping, it might well be the case that, for j = n +1, #nj
 = n. Here, some
rationing rule is needed to determine entry. Under some conditions, the speed of entry
acts as the rationing rule. We refer to these situations as contested entry and offer a
sufficient condition below:
Contested entry: Suppose that for i = 1, . . . , n+1, #ni
 = n. Then all competitors for
whom #ni
 = n will seek to enter at the earliest possible moment provided n(t)< n. Else they
will choose to stay out.
Proof: First, notice that entry must be contested. If not, then there exists some agent
i n+1 who is assigned to not enter in equilibrium and who can profitably deviate by
entering at the earliest possible moment conditional on the fact that the current number
of entrants is strictly less than n. By perfection, off equilibrium strategies of others
must call for non-entry once the number of entrants is n.35 Hence, entry will still be n
under such a deviation and this improves on the outside option for the deviating agent
i. Next, note that, under contested entry, all agents for whom i = n can do no better
than to enter at the earliest possible time provided total entry is less than n. Waiting
merely risks entry by another agent and, because entry is better than non-entry, any such
deviation leaves the agent worse off. Finally, for all j such that #nj
< n entry is clearly
not profitably because any entry deviation will still produce a situation where the total
number of entrants is n, and this is worse for j than not entering. This completes the
proof.
To summarize: Rationing is a necessary but not sufficient condition for contested
entry. If individuals are sufficiently heterogeneous, then belief-based equilibria can arise
where entry is non-contested. Likewise, the absence of rationing is a sufficient but
not necessary condition for non-contested entry. In the cases not covered by our two
sufficient conditions, both rationing and preference heterogeneity are present; thus, entry
may be contested or not. Precise characterization of all possible preference configurations
is beyond the scope of this analysis.
35. Technically, we require a beliefs restriction as well as perfection. Specifically, all deviations are viewed
as coming from some in+1 who was assigned not to enter. Because such a type stands to gain the most from
entry, divinity refinements support such beliefs.
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Application to Experiment Treatments
Let us now apply these results to our experimental setting, beginning with Baseline
and Shares. Because our types are mainly associated with preferences over natural
risk, which is absent in these treatments, the situation is one where all individuals are
identical. Hence, #ni
 = 2 for all i by our choice of parameters. This corresponds exactly
to our contested entry conditions; hence, we expect that individual i enters immediately
if n(ri)<2 and stays out otherwise. Thus always exactly two entrants are observed, and
entry occurs early in the game.
Let us now consider the WTA treatment. Essentially, this merely adds natural risk
to Shares. In this case, parameters are no longer identical as risk/loss aversion reduces
the perceived value of entrepreneurship relative to the outside option. This suggests that
#ni
2 for all i. From Assumption 1 above n = 2; however entry need not be contested.
For Coin Flip and Dual, the outside option now exhibits natural risk making entry
more appealing. We can say little about such a situation other than to predict that at least
two individuals enter. Whether equilibrium entry increases above two or is contested
depends on both the modeling and the specific parameter values assigned to θ .
Appendix C
Categorization of Study Fields for Business/Economics and
Numerate
Numerate:
Accounting, Architectural Engineering, Architectural Studies, Architecture, Biochem-
istry, Biochemistry and Biological Chemistry, Biology, Bioscience, Biotechnology,
Business, Chemical Engineering, Chemistry, Civil Engineering, Computer Science,
Economics, Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Engineering, Environmental
Engineering, Finance, Genetics, Industrial Economics, Information Technology, Interna-
tional Economics, Life Sciences, Management, Mathematics, Mechanical Engineering,
Medicine, Molecular Diagnostics, Neuroscience, Pharmacy, Physics, Risk Management.
Business/Economics:
Accounting, Business, Business Management, Business Studies, Economics, Finance, In-
dustrial Economics, International Economics, Management, Mathematics & Economics,
Risk Management.
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